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Abstract: 
Our study investigates firms’ internal digitalization as a crucial foundation for timely, data-
driven decision making. We evaluate the association between digital infrastructure and 
improved decision making in tax planning decisions to analyze if the benefits of digitalization 
expand beyond firms’ core business functions. The novel use of a survey that identifies 
European firms’ digital infrastructure over the period from 2005 to 2016 allows us to create an 
index of IT sophistication. Using this index, we extend prior approaches and observe the 
effectiveness of tax planning decisions in terms of a firm’s ability to exploit income shifting 
incentives. Our empirical analysis confirms the prediction that digitalized firms respond more 
efficiently to income shifting incentives. Further, we provide evidence that firms with 
sophisticated IT are more reactive to shocks in the income shifting incentive than non-digital 
firms. Our results suggest that internal digitalization allows firms to efficiently monitor and 
manage internal processes and to strategically price internal transactions. With this work, we 
are the first to document the association of digitalization and the performance of firms’ support 
functions. 
 
JEL: O33 L25 H25 H26 K34 
Keywords: Digital Transformation, Digitalization, Firm Performance, Decision Making, 
Multinational Corporations, Business Taxation, Information Technology, Profit Shifting 
 
We thank Richard Kneller, Christoph Spengel, the participants of the seventh annual Mannheim Taxation 
Conference and the participants of the second joint Walter Eucken Institute and ZEW workshop for their valuable 
suggestions and comments. This study is part of the Leibniz Community funded project on Taxation in the Era of 
Digitalization. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Graduate School of Economic and Social 
Sciences of the University of Mannheim.
1 
1. Introduction
The intensive use of information technologies (IT) profoundly affects how firms produce and 
provide goods and services (Cardona et al. 2013; OECD 2015). However, not only the business 
models of multinational corporations (MNCs) become increasingly digital, also business 
processes, operations and the organization itself turn digital and transparent (Grover et al. 
2018). In this paper, we investigate whether highly digitalized firms1 make use of the abundance 
of data provided by digital infrastructure to improve the performance of their tax function in 
the sense that they take more effective tax planning decisions. We see this as an exemplary 
study shedding light on the question of how digital sourcing of intra-firm data affects decision 
making in integral parts of business functions.   
Prior research has shown that investments in IT and data-driven decision making 
positively impact firm performance (Brynjolfsson et al., 2011; Hitt et al., 2002). However, it 
remains understudied whether improved decision making capabilities can also expand beyond 
firms’ core business functions to support functions such as the tax department. We hypothesize 
that the use of sophisticated IT software, i.e., big data analytics, enables the tax department to 
monitor and manage global and complex value chains, business processes as well as internal 
capital markets more efficiently. To test our hypothesis, we focus on the relation between IT-
sophistication and tax-motivated income shifting because efficient income shifting has an 
immediate positive effect on after-tax returns and effective tax planning involves the decision 
rule of maximizing after-tax returns (Scholes et al. 2016). 
To observe firms’ internal digitalization, we employ novel survey data on the digital 
infrastructure of European firms. We create a unique dataset by combining this survey with 
unconsolidated financial data of multinational corporations from ORBIS. In a similar vein as 
1 In our context, when we refer to digitalized firms, we mean firms that use sophisticated IT software to monitor 
and manage their internal business processes and operations. 
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Bloom et al. (2012, 2016), we develop an IT sophistication index to identify the extent of a 
firm’s internal digitalization. Our IT sophistication index captures firms’ access to up to three 
key software solutions to digitally monitor and manage firm performance: Enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) software, database management systems (DBMS) and groupware software. 
Sophisticated IT infrastructure enables a comprehensive view of a firm’s operations and 
business processes and allows to efficiently and effectively monitor and manage multinational 
groups.  
Tax-motivated income shifting from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions is considered the 
dominant method of tax departments to reduce the firm’s worldwide tax burden. To observe 
income shifting, the well-established approach of Huizinga and Laeven (2008) examines the 
relation between affiliate reported pre-tax profit and the income shifting incentive. The income 
shifting incentive is a weighted average of an affiliate’s tax rate differential to other affiliates 
within the corporate group.2 Hence, a positive value indicates that an affiliate has incentives to 
relocate income to other affiliates while a negative value indicates that an affiliate attracts 
income of other group’s affiliates. Consistent with prior literature, we find a negative relation 
between reported pre-tax profit and income shifting incentive. Considering a firm’s internal 
digitalization, we hypothesize that firms with higher IT sophistication better observe their 
income shifting incentive and can adjust the tax-planning decisions accordingly. For this 
reason, we extend the approach of Huizinga and Laeven (2008) by our IT sophistication index.  
Our initial graphical binned scatter analysis directly shows that within the group of firms 
that have a high incentive to shift income outwards, firms with high software sophistication 
report a relatively lower average profitability and vice versa. However, if firms have no 
incentive to relocate income, the level of software sophistication is irrelevant for firms’ average 
profitability. This suggests that firms with higher IT sophistication exploit their income shifting 
                                                 
2 See chapter 3.3. for a detailed description of the calculation and meaning of the income shifting incentive variable. 
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incentives more efficiently. Coherently, plotted regression lines for each group of IT 
sophistication indicate that the expected negative association between the income shifting 
incentive and firm profitability only exists for digitalized firms. The profitability of 
multinationals without sophisticated software seems to be relatively insensitive to the income 
shifting incentive measure.  
Regression analyses further corroborate these findings. The coefficient of interest is the 
interaction of the income shifting incentive variable and the IT sophistication index. We 
estimate an interaction coefficient of -0.240. The statistically significant coefficient implies that 
firms with more sophisticated IT infrastructure exhibit a stronger tax responsiveness of reported 
profits than firms without this infrastructure.  
Furthermore, we find that the found relation between IT sophistication and tax planning 
is even more pronounced for internationally dispersed firms. This finding makes sense as we 
expect those firms to be even more opaque. We also find a stronger relation for firms whose 
managers have accounting knowledge that helps them to exploit the provided information for 
international income relocation.  
To further strengthen our findings, we follow an alternative identification strategy and 
exploit quasi-random shocks to the income shifting incentive variable. As the income shifting 
incentive variable is a dynamic measure of the differential in corporate income tax rates a MNC 
faces in its jurisdictions of operations, we use this dynamic and look at large changes to the 
incentive variable caused by potentially exogenous corporate income tax rate changes. We 
expect that firms with a higher IT sophistication index are able to better observe the tax rate 
differentials and, thus, are more reactive to shocks in the incentive measure. Our results confirm 
this prediction. Furthermore, our results are robust across several specifications, such as 
controlling for firms’ usage of intellectual property, changing the structure of the income 
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shifting incentive measure and analyzing different tax planning channels of multinational 
corporations.  
With this work, we contribute to the literature on the effects of information processing 
technologies on firm performance. Information and the ability to generate meaningful 
knowledge from data improve decision making and can be a key competitive advantage (Aral 
et al. 2012; Brynjolfsson et al. 2011; Grover et al. 2018; Hitt et al. 2002; Janssen et al. 2017). 
Our results indicate that digital technologies do not only affect core business functions but that 
they also improve the performance of supporting functions.  
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to focus on the technological abilities 
of multinational firms to monitor and manage internal processes of non-core business functions 
and to price internal transactions strategically. As Brynjolfsson and McElheran (2016) argue, 
firms with a more sophisticated digital infrastructure have more information to draw on, 
enabling a more holistic view of a group’s financial performance. Transferring this argument 
into the context of tax-related decision making, we agree with Scholes et al. (2016) that 
“effective tax planning requires the planner to consider the tax implications of a proposed 
transaction for all parties to the transaction. This is a global or multilateral, rather than a 
unilateral, approach”. Hence, digital infrastructure turns out to be a key enabler of effective tax 
planning decisions. In this vein, our analysis adds to the findings of Gallemore and Labro (2015) 
and McGuire et al. (2018), indicating that the income of firms with better information quality 
is more responsive to tax avoidance and income shifting. We go beyond what is known so far 
by investigating firms’ digital infrastructure as a crucial foundation for timely, data-driven 
decision making. Exemplarily, we evaluate the association between IT sophistication and 
improved decision making in tax planning decisions. According to Scholes et al. (2016), 
“effective tax planning involves considering the role of taxes when implementing the decision 
rule of maximizing after-tax returns.” In this regard, we evaluate the effectiveness of tax 
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planning decisions in terms of a firm’s ability to exploit income shifting incentives. Hence, we 
also contribute to the momentum gaining debate on the extent and determinants of tax-
motivated income shifting (Amberger and Osswald 2020; Blouin and Robinson 2019; Chen et 
al. 2019; De Simone et al. 2017; Markle 2016). 
The structure of our analysis is as follows. Chapter two provides the conceptual 
framework and develops our hypothesis. The third chapter lays out our data. Moreover, we 
develop an IT sophistication index and explain our methodological approach. In chapter four, 
we present our results and robustness tests. Chapter five concludes. 
2. Conceptual framework and hypothesis development 
Back in the day, firms’ internal digitalization began with the usage of telephones, which 
allowed firms to expand their business activities across multiple locations (Hardy 1980). Later, 
personal computers were available to firms that performed basic calculations and stored data. 
Nowadays, internal digitalization has become a key value driver. An extensive pool of IT3 is 
available to firms that, for example, automate operations, integrate and streamline processes or 
enable communication without borders and that reach from customer relationship management 
over production planning to forecasting financials. Simultaneously, the amount of available 
data that is available, both from internal processes and external stakeholders, and can be 
exploited by firms has outgrown any imaginable scale (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2012). Thus, 
firms that promote internal digitalization and use the potential of IT should, ceteris paribus, be 
able to make better decisions, create a competitive advantage and ultimately increase firm 
value.  
Brynjolfsson et al. (2011) provide an overview of the theory of the relation between IT, 
better information and decision making. The authors demonstrate that the effective usage of IT 
                                                 
3 We follow Whisler & Leavitt, (1958) loosely and define IT as a system that rapidly processes large amounts of 
data and applies statistical and mathematical methods to support decision making. We also consider systems 
that enable the organization and communication of geographically dispersed groups of people as IT. 
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leads to better and more information that, in turn, allows for a more granular knowledge on the 
potential outcomes of decisions by reducing the noise between the potential results 
(Brynjolfsson et al. 2011). In addition, firms with sophisticated information processing 
techniques, such as digital infrastructure, are able to convert information into value at lower 
costs and with greater efficiency (Brynjolfsson et al. 2011; Galbraith 1974).  
Other research evaluates the effect of IT implementation on the performance of core 
business operations. Among others, Hitt et al. (2002) find a positive association between the 
adoption of an enterprise resource planning (ERP) system and profit margins, return on assets 
and other key performance indicators. The availability of an ERP system seems to be essential 
for improved decision making at the operational unit (Aral et al. 2012; McAfee 2002). 
Furthermore, prior literature shows that discovering valuable knowledge in databases, i.e., 
implementing big data analytics, can improve businesses’ efficiency, effectiveness, and 
productivity (Fayyad et al. 1996; Grover et al. 2018). Thereby, the positive impact of big data 
analytics on decision making quality depends on a firm’s capabilities to integrate big data 
analytics into the existing process, the existence of highly skilled employees to handle the data 
and technical systems to store and process the data (Janssen et al. 2017). A recent study of 814 
firms that use big data analytics indicates that the productivity of these firms is positively 
associated with their big data analytics capabilities (Müller et al. 2018). 
So far, research has provided evidence that the core business operations gain from the 
implementation of IT. However, it remains understudied whether the advantages also expand 
beyond firms’ core business operations. McAfee (2002) protocols, for example, that an ERP 
adoption at the operational level does not elicit major changes to a firm’s general technological 
infrastructure or business processes. However, since IT systems are often implemented as 
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holistic solutions4 that connect operations with support functions, an increase in a firm’s IT 
sophistication should also improve decision making in support functions such as the tax 
department. Ultimately, the accuracy of this theory may be an empirical question.  
 One of the objectives of the tax department is to maximize firm value by exploiting tax 
planning opportunities (Robinson et al. 2010). Following Scholes et al. (2016), this “requires 
the planner to consider the tax implications of a proposed transaction for all parties to the 
transaction.” In multinational groups with global operations, this endeavor may be highly 
complex and opaque. IT usage could help reduce this complexity and make internal transfer 
prices, transactions, or capital flow better observable. In other words, and in line with 
Brynjolfsson et al. (2011), the usage of sophisticated IT might increase the information quality 
within the tax department5, improve processes between affiliated tax departments and, finally, 
lead to more successful decision making.  
Generally, in the context of business taxation, better decision making is associated with 
the maximization of after-tax profits (Robinson et al. 2010; Scholes et al. 2016). In order to 
analyze whether the usage of sophisticated IT leads to better decision making in the tax 
department, we measure better decision making in terms of a firm’s ability to exploit income 
shifting incentives by relocating income to tax-favored locations since this is directly linked to 
maximizing after-tax profits. This rationale leads to our first hypothesis:  
H1: Reported profits are more sensitive to an income shifting incentive for firms with a 
pronounced digital infrastructure than for firms without sophisticated IT. 
                                                 
4 For example, SAP, one of the leading information system providers, advertises its ERP system with the slogan: 
“Connect all departments and functions with a future-proof ERP system for resilience and operational 
excellence” https://www.sap.com/products/erp-financial-management.html (accessed: 07/28/20). 
5 In prior studies, McGuire et al. (2018) and Gallemore and Labro (2015) examine the relationship between the 
quality of internal information and tax planning. They find that higher internal information quality enables firms 
to engage in greater tax avoidance or shift more income. 
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Overall, internal digitalization enables a comprehensive view of the firm’s operations and 
business processes and allows to efficiently and effectively monitor and manage multinational 
groups. IT seems to have a positive impact on the decision making and performance of firms’ 
core operations. However, it is unclear whether the improved decision making capabilities also 
expand to support functions such as the tax department. To corroborate our first hypothesis and 
shed light on the effects of the digital transformation on business support functions, we test 
whether firms with detailed knowledge of their global activities react more directly to large 
shocks to the income shifting incentive measure.  
H2: In contrast to less digitalized firms, firms with sophisticated IT software directly 
adjust their reported profits in response to changes in the income shifting incentive. 
3. Identifying digital technology and estimation approach 
3.1. Data and sample 
We exploit the Aberdeen computer intelligence and technology database (CiTDB) to identify 
firms’ usage of sophisticated IT. The database comprises detailed survey data on the use of IT 
and covers establishments across twenty European countries. The Aberdeen group, which 
maintains the CiTDB mainly to support sales and marketing decisions of IT goods and services 
distributors, contacts more than 200.000 firms per year and questions high-level IT employees 
on the current status of a firm’s hardware and software usage. The CiTDB data is restricted to 
firms with at least 100 employees, which excludes newly founded firms and small firms. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that firms with at least 100 employees are the most relevant 
firms for our empirical analysis. The database has already been used in several empirical studies 
in the economics literature to measure different dimensions of digitalization at the micro-level 
(Bloom et al. 2012; 2014; 2016; Bresnahan et al. 2002; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003; Candel 
Haug et al. 2016; Forman et al. 2014; Mahr 2010; De Stefano et al. 2017). Yet, most of these 
prior studies use U.S. data that dates back at least ten years. Our European Aberdeen CiTDB 
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survey panel covers the years 2005 through 2016. To evaluate the relation of the firm’s 
digitalization degree and the performance of their non-core business functions, it is necessary 
to enhance the Aberdeen dataset with detailed financial information.   
We use unconsolidated financial data and ownership information from the Bureau van 
Dijk’s ORBIS database. All unconsolidated firm-level financial data for our sample from 2005 
to 2016 is subject to a basic cleaning procedure following Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015). We 
merge the Aberdeen CiTDB to the ORBIS database, based on unique firm names.6 As we want 
to investigate the cross-border activities of multinational firms, we keep only affiliates in our 
sample that belong to a MNC. We keep all firms of a MNC for which we find at least one 
affiliate with a concordance. We define MNCs as a group of affiliates with more than 50 percent 
ownership chains and at least one cross-border relation. We use this sample to calculate an 
intra-group income shifting incentive variable (C-Index) for each MNC’s affiliate.7 
The Aberdeen CiTDB contains survey responses for our variables of interest of up to 10 
percent of their address pool per year. Hence, after calculating the intra-group income shifting 
incentive for each affiliate, we only keep affiliates for which we observe a CiTDB survey 
response.8 We do so since anecdotal evidence suggests that the IT deployment can be very 
different between affiliates that belong to the same MNC.9 In line with our empirical 
specification, we exclude loss-making affiliates and exclude affiliates without sufficient data 
on our dependent variables. Our final sample consists of 144,796 firm-years, with 24,715 
unique firms that belong to 12,216 multinational groups. See Table 1 for an overview of the 
sample selection process and Table 2 for the geographic dispersion of our final sample. 
                                                 
6 A simple name matching procedure is the most appropriate method to link the CiTDB firms – due to a lack of a 
globally applicable identifier – to the ORBIS database. 
7 See chapter 3.3. for a detailed description of the calculation and meaning of the income shifting incentive variable 
(C-Index). 
8 If a firm is not part of the survey wave in a specific year, but the database provides information for preceding 
and subsequent years, we interpolate the available information. 
9 Our anecdotal evidence relies on consultation with SAP staff on the usage of SAP solutions within multinational 
groups. 
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Information on effective corporate income tax (CIT) rates are taken from the Taxation 
and Customs Union Directorate-General (TAXUD) database, the Oxford Center for Business 
Taxation (CBT) tax database and the EY’s Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides. Macro-level 
control data on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP per capita and unemployment rates 
are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.  
3.2. Measuring digitalization at the micro-level 
We develop a novel internal digitalization index – the IT sophistication index (IT index). Our 
IT index captures firms’ access to key software solutions. This stays in contrast to earlier studies 
that have only relied on the ratio of personal computers (PCs) to total employees as a measure 
of IT intensity (Bloom et al. 2012; Forman 2005; Hershbein and Kahn 2018).  
In light of the significant digital and technological developments over the last decade, the 
ratio of personal computers per employee no longer seems sufficient to measure firms’ degree 
of digitalization. The costs for personal computers have plummeted and the number of PCs at 
a site can easily outgrow the number of employees. To benefit from the era of digitalization, 
firms rather have to connect information, link processes and automate workflows. These 
capabilities require the usage of sophisticated software solutions. Recent studies have already 
tried to capture this dimension of digitalization by using the availability of different software 
types, provided by the CiTDB survey, as a proxy for the level of a firm’s degree of digitalization 
(Bloom et al. 2014; 2016; Candel Haug et al. 2016).  
We combine the CiTDB survey responses to the questions on the usage of three different 
key software solutions to measure a firm’s IT sophistication: The usage of an enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) system, a database management system (DBMS) and groupware 
software. These software solutions contribute to the internal digitalization of firms along 
different dimensions and are therefore well suited to be combined in a comprehensive index. 
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An ERP system is a software solution – or a combination of software solutions – that 
provides detailed information on a firm’s resources and activities. In general, ERP systems are 
adapted to the specific needs of a firm’s operations and designed to integrate, optimize and 
control different stages of a value creation process. Core features of the system usually help 
corporations to plan and monitor procurement, production, invoicing, human resources and 
financial reporting. ERP systems become increasingly important for all kinds of business 
models and are essential for the digitalization process of corporations (Haddara and Elragal 
2015; Hitt et al. 2002). In the last decade, ERP providers, such as SAP or Oracle, have 
developed applications that allow real-time analysis of processes and offer flexible solutions 
for small and large businesses.  
Database management systems provide access to databases. They enable the systematic 
storage of data, data maintenance and interaction with the data (Connolly and Begg 2014). A 
rigorous data management is essential for internal process evaluations and it is a critical 
infrastructure element to enable big data analytics (Grover et al. 2018). According to Grover et 
al. (2018), DBMS generate the principal value for big data analytics – that allows real-time 
business insights and the basis for well-reasoned decision making – by combining different 
existing and new data sources. A structured data collection and the pre-processing of data is 
also at the core of data mining processes (Fayyad et al. 1996; Hand et al. 2000).  
Groupware software enables close interaction and information exchange within an 
organization. Prior research has shown evidence on the reduced efficiency of indirect 
communication via digital channels compared to face-to-face interaction (Hightower and 
Sayeed 1995; McGrath and Hollingshead 1994; Shim et al. 2002). Yet, interactive groupware 
software, with communication tools such as videoconferencing, can create effective virtual 
teams that can process information fast and collaborate in a decision making process. Fast 
internet connections, mobile devices and social networks within firms can support the necessary 
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informal exchange via computer-mediated communication tools (Shim et al. 2002). Groupware 
software, such as Microsoft Teams, has shown to be a major facilitator of collaboration between 
dispersed team members in the 2020 Corona pandemic. 
We combine all survey responses on the availability of one of the three software 
categories to create an additive index that ranges from zero, no software is available at all in 
the firm, to three, the firm uses all software categories. Table 3 provides an overview of the 
dispersion of categories in our sample.10 A firm with no access to any of the software categories 
(indicator equals zero) is considered a non-digitalized corporation. Firms with an indicator 
value of three, i.e., using all software types, are classified as the most digitalized in our sample.  
3.3. Methodology  
To measure the impact of digitalization on improved decision making in a firm’s tax 
department, we employ the methodology of Hines and Rice (1994), later extended by Huizinga 
and Laeven (2008), which identifies MNCs’ profit shifting activities. The model assumes that 
the total income of an affiliate is the sum of true profits and shifted profits. While true profits 
are empirically impossible to observe, the model approximates the true income with the help of 
the traditional Cobb-Douglas production function as the return to invested capital, labor and 
productivity. This function is expanded by an income shifting incentive measure to estimate the 
responsiveness of the total income to shifting activities. The income shifting incentive measure 
is determined through the affiliate specific tax rate differential (Huizinga and Laeven 2008). 
Since digitalized firms can better monitor internal processes and communicate more 
productively, they should also better observe their available incentives to shift income for tax 
purposes. Hence, we analyze whether digitalized firms relocate income more efficiently. 
                                                 
10 We interpolate the IT sophistication index to account for years in which the firm was not part of the survey 
wave. Results remain robust if a non-interpolated IT sophistication index is used.  
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Exploiting this setting allows us to draw conclusions on whether digitalized firms make more 
tax-efficient decisions.  
The model is commonly applied in the profit shifting literature and extended by many 
authors to capture different profit shifting determinants (Amberger and Osswald 2020; Beer 
and Loeprick 2015; Chen et al. 2019; De Simone et al. 2017; Markle 2016). We follow this 
literature and enhance the model with a measure for firms’ level of IT sophistication:  
log(𝑃𝐿𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽1log⁡(𝑇𝐹𝐴𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2log⁡(𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐹)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3log⁡(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4C𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5D𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6C𝑖𝑡 ∗ D𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗X𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝜗𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,          (1) 
where i and t are indicators for the firm and year, respectively. The dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of profit and loss before tax (PLBT) from unconsolidated financial accounts. 
In contrast to earnings before income and taxes (EBIT), PLBT captures profit shifting via 
transfer pricing and intracompany financing decisions. We do not limit our analysis to a specific 
profit shifting channel as a sophisticated digital infrastructure can increase firms’ abilities to 
relocate income in multiple dimensions.  
In line with prior literature, we use the natural logarithm of tangible fixed assets (TFAS) 
as a proxy for capital, the natural logarithm of employee compensation (STAF) as a proxy for 
labor and the median return on assets within industry, country and year as a proxy for 
productivity (Amberger and Osswald 2020; De Simone et al. 2017; Markle 2016).  
The variable C𝑖𝑡 is the income shifting incentive measure, as defined by Huizinga and Laeven 
(2008). The C-Index is the operating revenue (OPRE)-weighted average tax rate differential, of 
each firm to all other affiliates of a group, per year:  
   𝐶-𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 =
∑ 𝑂𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑘∗(𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖−𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑘)
𝑛
𝑘≠𝑖
∑ 𝑂𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
,          (2) 
where i, k and n are indicators for a firm, related affiliates and the total number of affiliates per 
group and year, respectively. The variable OPRE is the operating revenue of the group’s 
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affiliates and 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖 (𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑘) is the effective corporate income tax rate applicable to a firm (related 
firms). A positive value of the C-Index indicates that a firm has incentives to relocate profits to 
other affiliates while a negative value indicates that an entity attracts profits of other group’s 
affiliates. By construction, the average C-Index of all affiliates of a MNC is zero. In robustness 
tests, we also use the CIT as an alternative income shifting incentive measure. 
D𝑖𝑡 is the IT sophistication index. The variable can range from zero to three. This 
modification of the standard Huizinga and Laeven (2008) model allows us to evaluate the 
heterogeneity of profit shifting between firms with different degrees of digitalization. We 
expect 𝛽6, our coefficient of interest, to be negative. A significant coefficient on the interaction 
term C𝑖𝑡 ∗ D𝑖𝑡 provides evidence that firms with sophisticated software respond differently to 
the income shifting incentive measure than less digitalized firms. In additional analyses, we 
include firm- and manager-characteristics to provide evidence on cross-sectional variation in 
an alternative specification.  
X𝑖𝑡 is a vector of j firm-specific control variables. We control for the natural logarithm of 
GDP, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita and the unemployment rate in the affiliate’s host 
country. Our regression includes a number of fixed effects. We include individual industry fixed 
effects, 𝜇𝑖𝑛𝑑, to control for any unobservable systematic differences between different 
industries and we include year fixed effects, 𝜂𝑡, to eliminate general economic shocks or any 
other time-trends unrelated to our research question. This specification maintains cross-
sectional variation in our sample for firms whose IT sophistication index level does not change. 
Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error term.  
As an alternative identification approach, we exploit the changes in firms’ C-Index 
variable to analyze the reactiveness of firms with a digital infrastructure to altered income 
shifting incentives. We expect that a higher degree of IT sophistication enables firms to better 
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adjust their reported income towards new income shifting incentives, i.e., to appropriately 
change decisions in response to an altered situation. 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive results and graphical evidence 
Before providing the results of our regression approach, we analyze our sample descriptively, 
focusing on our IT sophistication index. Table 4 depicts the descriptive statistics of our sample. 
The average firm has total assets of more than 123 million euro and profits before tax of more 
than 8.6 million euro during the sample period. On average, firms do not have an incentive to 
shift profits in either direction (C-Index of -0.001). The median firm has access to two software 
categories. As outlined in Table 3, the IT index is zero for less than 20 percent of our sample 
and in more than 25 percent of the firm-years, the index has the highest value of three. 
Furthermore, we descriptively plot firms’ profits measured as return on assets against 
firms’ income shifting incentives to relocate income. We use return on assets rather than 
absolute PLBT values to increase the descriptive comparability of firms. Figure 1 depicts the 
binned scatter plot following Giroud and Mueller (2019). The binned scatter plot clusters firms 
along the range of possible C-Indices into 15 groups and plots the average return on assets per 
group. It is immediately visible that if firms have no incentive to relocate income – i.e., affiliates 
have a C-Index close to zero – the level of software sophistication is irrelevant for firms’ 
average return on assets. However, if firms have a high incentive to relocate income outwards 
(positive C-Index), firms with high software sophistication, indicated by the green and yellow 
dots, have a low average return on assets, comparatively. On the other hand, firms in low-tax 
jurisdictions, with negative C-Index values, have a comparatively high profitability ratio if they 
have access to sophisticated software. The scatter plot indicates a negative association between 
the income shifting incentive and firm profitability only for digitalized corporations. The 
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profitability of multinationals without sophisticated software seems relatively insensitive to the 
income shifting incentive measure.  
4.2. Baseline Results 
Before testing our hypothesis, we replicate the basic Huizinga and Laeven (2008) regression to 
provide evidence on the well-established income shifting incentive sensitivity of reported 
profits in our sample of multinational firms. We estimate a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for the C-Index in Column 1 of Table 5, which indicates that multinational 
corporations relocate income to low-tax jurisdictions. In terms of magnitude, our estimate of -
0.516 is slightly below the consensus estimate of approximately -0.8, but in line with estimates 
using samples of more recent time periods (Dharmapala 2014; Heckemeyer and Overesch 
2017). As expected, we also show that the estimates of the Cobb-Douglas coefficients, capital, 
labor and productivity, have a positive and statistically significant effect on firms’ profitability. 
Our estimates on the country control variables are, in general, also in line with the expected 
direction.  
Column two to four in Table 5 provide the baseline results for our first hypothesis. The 
coefficient of interest is the interaction of our income shifting incentive measure, C-Index, and 
the IT sophistication index. We estimate an interaction coefficient of -0.240. The statistically 
significant coefficient implies that firms with more sophisticated IT infrastructure exhibit a 
stronger tax responsiveness of reported profits than firms without this infrastructure. Figure 2 
provides graphical evidence on the estimated profitability at different levels of IT 
sophistications for firms with different incentives to relocate income. The upper panel shows 
firms with no or only one software category available at the firm. The estimates indicate a 
moderate tax sensitivity of reported profits that is not statistically significant for firms without 
any sophisticated software. As depicted in the lower panel, the profits of firms with more than 
two software categories at their site are more sensitive to the income shifting incentive measure. 
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A negative slope indicates that firms relocate income towards low-tax jurisdictions, which is 
an outcome of effective tax planning decisions. The slope is steepest for firms with the highest 
value of our IT sophistication index.  
To disentangle the different levels of our IT sophistication index more formally, we 
interact each index level separately with the income shifting incentive measure. We find a 
negative interaction coefficient for all index levels. The results are depicted in Table 5 Column 
3. The inclusion of a categorical variable relaxes the functional form assumption and allows us 
to estimate the tax sensitivity of reported profits for each index level separately. We again find 
that the estimated tax sensitivity of reported profits is highest for firms with access to all three 
software solutions.   
Finally, we replace the IT sophistication measure with a dummy variable that indicates if 
a firm has access to any software category. Column 4 shows that firms with an IT sophistication 
level of more than one shift significantly more income. The estimate indicates a combined semi-
elasticity of -0.655 (0.154 + -0.809 = -0.655). This implies that if the income shifting incentive 
decreases by ten percentage points, e.g., from 0.2 to 0.1, the natural log of profit and loss before 
tax increases by 6.55 percent. At the mean PLBT, this corresponds in absolute terms to an 
increase of reported profits by more than 500 million euro (from 8.528 million to 9.087 million 
euro).  
Interpreting differences in the C-Index can be difficult because many factors can 
influence the C-Index (De Simone et al. 2017). Anything else equal, a tax rate reduction of 
more than ten percentage points – as in the United States after the 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs Act 
or in Germany after the 2008 tax reform – has a considerable effect on the tax variable and 
reduces the incentive to relocate income towards low tax jurisdictions. We exploit the quasi-
random changes in firms’ C-Index variable to analyze the reactiveness of firms with a digital 
infrastructure to altered income shifting incentives and test our second hypothesis. Our setting 
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of European affiliates is ideal for this approach as many European member states changed their 
statutory tax rates during our sample period. Thus, the relative tax attractiveness of affiliates is 
subject to several exogenous shocks. We focus in our analysis on affiliates that experience the 
largest downward and upward income shifting incentive shock.  
The income shifting incentive shock is measured as the annual change of the affiliate 
specific C-Index. Firms in the lowest decile of this measure experience a large downward 
change of the C-Index. Thus, the affiliate’s group has an incentive to shift income to the affiliate 
and we expect those with more IT sophistication to obtain more income. In contrast, firms in 
the highest decile experience a large upward change of the C-Index. Therefore, the affiliate’s 
group has an incentive to lower the reported income of the affiliate. We expect that firms with 
high IT sophistication can react to this change in income shifting incentives more efficiently. 
Our results are depicted in Table 6. The first column analyzes the firms in the lowest shock 
decile, i.e., firms with a negative C-Index change. We interact the dummy that identifies firm-
years with the largest negative C-Index changes with our IT sophistication dummy. The 
coefficient estimate implies that digital firms react more to the income shifting incentive change 
with an upward adjustment of their reported income. Column two analyzes the group of firms 
with the largest positive C-Index changes. We find a significant negative interaction coefficient, 
which is in line with our expectations. This provides evidence that the tax department of digital 
corporations can incorporate altered circumstances better than the one of non-digital firms.   
Our results provide evidence on the association between IT sophistication and decision 
making for tax planning decisions. Digital infrastructure shows to be a crucial foundation for 
timely, data-driven decision making that extends even beyond core business functions to 
support functions such as the tax department. 
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4.3. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
We conduct several cross-sectional tests to exploit different firm-characteristics and 
characteristics of firms’ managers. First, the advantages of a high IT sophistication may be 
proportional to the complexity of a firm’s structure. We proxy the complexity of a firm with its 
international dispersion, which we measure as the ratio of countries in which the group has 
affiliates over the group’s total number of affiliates. Table 7 depicts the results. We provide 
evidence that the association between the income shifting incentive measure and IT 
sophistication is more relevant for internationally dispersed firms. I.e., the higher the 
international dispersion and the higher the degree of IT sophistication, the more negative is the 
association between reported income and the income shifting incentive measure to relocate 
income from high- to low-tax jurisdictions.  
Second, we investigate if firms with dedicated accounting managers exploit the additional 
information from the sophisticated IT infrastructure better. We expect that firms with a specific 
accounting department can better process the obtained information and have better knowledge 
of how to relocate income in line with international regulations. We use information on 
managers from Orbis to identify if a firm has an accounting manager. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 
7 show the results of this analysis. As expected, firms with an accounting manager have a more 
negative tax sensitivity for their reported profits. This relation is even stronger if the firm has 
access to sophisticated IT infrastructure.  
4.4. Robustness tests 
In additional robustness tests, we use a non-interpolated IT sophistication index, include 
additional control variables, change our income shifting incentive measure and change the 
dependent variable.  
First, we replicate our main table with a non-interpolated index to control for any potential 
bias by our interpolation. The results are depicted in Table 8. Even if we include only firms for 
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which we exactly know their survey response, all inferences remain as in our main results. Yet, 
we lose some observations, which lowers our statistical power.  
Second, in Table 9, we include the logarithm of intangible assets as an additional control 
variable in our regression. Several studies show that intangible assets, patents or research and 
development activities provide an opportunity to relocate income (De Simone et al. 2016; 
Dischinger and Riedel 2011). Intangible assets are, in general, difficult to value for tax purposes 
and their relocation or extensive license payments provide a channel to shift profits. The first 
two columns of Table 9 show that keeping the level of intangibles constant, we still find a 
significant negative coefficient for the interaction of the income shifting incentive variable, C-
Index, and our IT sophistication index. This confirms our evidence that firms with a digital 
infrastructure – independent of their use of intangible assets – tend to relocate income more 
aggressively. 
Third, we replace the income shifting incentive variable. The C-Index, which is a 
weighted tax rate differential, can be affected by many different factors (De Simone et al. 2017). 
Hence, we use the corporate income tax rate as an easy to interpret income shifting incentive 
measure. Higher corporate income taxes should be associated with lower reported profits if the 
income-shifting hypothesis holds. Indeed, our estimation in column 3 and 4 of Table 9 indicates 
that firms without sophisticated digital infrastructure do not seem to react to the CIT incentive. 
In contrast, firms with an IT sophistication index value of one or three do react.  
Finally, we replace our dependent variable, the logarithm of PLBT, with the logarithm of 
earnings before interest and taxes. This measure neglects debt shifting as an income relocation 
channel. The results in columns 5 and 6 of Table 9 focus only on the transfer pricing profit-
shifting channel and indicate that firms with sophisticated IT relocate income via transfer 
prices. However, our income-shifting estimate is slightly smaller than in our main results, which 
implies that firms use both income-shifting channels. 
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5. Conclusion 
Our paper investigates whether highly digitalized firms make use of the abundance of data 
provided by the digital infrastructure to improve the performance of their tax function in the 
sense that they take more effective tax planning decisions. We see this as an exemplary study 
shedding light on how digital sourcing of intra-firm data affects decision making in integral 
parts of business functions. Our hypothesis is based on the commonly accepted objective of 
corporations to maximize after-tax returns. This involves effective tax planning decisions by 
the tax department to minimize the global tax burden. We expect that the use of sophisticated 
IT enables the tax department to monitor and manage global and complex value chains, business 
processes as well as internal capital markets more efficiently. Hence, we apply the well-known 
Huizinga and Leaven (2008) income shifting model to evaluate if reported profits of 
multinationals with sophisticated IT are more sensitive to an income shifting incentive measure.  
We first develop a novel dataset that combines survey data on IT usage in European 
affiliates over the period 2005 to 2016 with rich financial data from the BvD ORBIS database. 
Our IT sophistication index captures firms’ access to up to three key software solutions – that 
capture three relevant dimensions of digitalization – to digitally monitor and manage firm 
performance: ERP software, DBMS and groupware software.  
Next, we provide descriptive evidence that if firms have a high (low) incentive to relocate 
income outwards (C-Index positive (negative)), firms with high software sophistication have a 
relatively lower (higher) average return on assets. This initial evidence is consistent with our 
empirical analysis. We estimate an interaction coefficient of -0.240. The statistically significant 
coefficient implies that firms with more sophisticated IT infrastructure exhibit a stronger tax 
responsiveness of reported profits than firms without this infrastructure. Following an 
alternative identification strategy, we exploit the changes in the C-Index variable to show that 
firms with a higher IT sophistication index react more strongly to quasi-random shocks in tax 
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planning incentives. The results are robust across several specifications, e.g., controlling for 
firms’ usage of intellectual property or narrowing down the possible tax planning channels of 
multinational corporations. 
Overall, our results provide evidence on the association between IT sophistication and 
decision making in a firm’s tax departments. We find that firms that employ sophisticated IT 
infrastructure make more efficient tax planning decisions. Digital infrastructure shows to be a 
crucial foundation for timely, data-driven decision making that extends even beyond core 
business functions to support functions such as the tax department.  
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Descriptive Evidence – Binned scatterplot 
 
Notes: This figure shows a binned scatterplot. Firms at each digitalization level are grouped into 15 equally sized 
bins along the range of the C-Index. The colored dots depict the average return on assets (in decimals) within each 
bin at the bin’s average C-Index value (in decimals). Each color represents a different degree of digitalization. The 
plotted lines provide an estimate of the linear relation between the C-Index and the return on assets. It controls for 
firm- and industry-fixed effects.  
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Figure 2: Tax sensitivity at different IT index levels 
 
Notes: The Figure depicts the predictive margins of the logarithm of PLBT over the C-Index range for different 
levels of the IT Index. The vertical lines represent the 95% confidence interval.  
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TABLES 
Table 1: Sample selection procedure 
Step Reduction Remaining 
observations 
Available firm-years in ORBIS (2005-2016)  44,766,410 
Basic cleaning according to Kalemli-Ozcan (2015) -296,607 44,469,803 
Groups without any affiliate that has a CiTDB to ORBIS 
concordance 
-37,396,192 7,073,611 
Domestic groups -3,752,434 3,321,177 
Firms without CiTDB survey response (IT Index missing) -3,105,675 215,502 
Firms with losses -49,178 166,324 
Firms without cost of employees -13,088 153,236 
Firms without C-Index -4,644 148,592 
Firms without other control variables -3,796 144,796 
Notes: The sample selection procedure starts with the complete set of available firm-years in the BvD ORBIS 
database and the column reduction depicts the number of firm-years that is lost in each step. The column 
remaining observations depicts the remaining firm-years after each step, respectively. 
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Table 2: Sample geographical dispersion 
Country firm-years in percent firms in percent 
Austria 10,324 7.13% 1,506 6.09% 
Belgium 11,130 7.69% 1,493 6.04% 
Czech Republic 6,118 4.23% 1,065 4.31% 
Denmark 4,709 3.25% 723 2.93% 
Finland 4,242 2.93% 645 2.61% 
France 18,973 13.10% 3,517 14.23% 
Germany 21,136 14.60% 3,775 15.27% 
Hungary 3,306 2.28% 421 1.70% 
Ireland 1,582 1.09% 328 1.33% 
Italy 15,621 10.79% 2,448 9.90% 
Luxembourg 929 0.64% 165 0.67% 
Netherlands 2,408 1.66% 664 2.69% 
Norway 2,769 1.91% 500 2.02% 
Poland 2,748 1.90% 682 2.76% 
Portugal 3,495 2.41% 586 2.37% 
Slovak Republic 1,896 1.31% 354 1.43% 
Spain 14,054 9.71% 2,197 8.89% 
Sweden 1,991 1.38% 397 1.61% 
Switzerland 100 0.07% 13 0.05% 
United Kingdom  17,264 11.92% 3,236 13.09% 
Total 144,795   24,715   
Notes: The table depicts the country dispersion.  
 
 
Table 3: Index composition 
IT Index level firm-years in percent 
0 28,455 19.65% 
1 28,290 19.54% 
2 51,093 35.29% 
3 36,957 25.52% 
Total  144,795   
      
 
 
3
3
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  n Mean SD Min p25 Median p75 Max 
EBIT 144,728 6,080 75,371 -11,928,418 526 1,566 4,372 8,055,006 
PLBT 144,795 8,528 79,016 0 540 1,646 4,765 9,200,259 
Total Assets 144,795 123,400 1,740,354 11 9,522 21,871 56,527 303,805,821 
Tangible Assets 144,795 17,239 138,141 0 533 2,469 8,689 10,899,548 
Employee Compensation 144,795 12,955 265,206 0 2,713 5,500 11,481 96,241,793 
Ln(EBIT) 138,823 7.416 1.600 -3.244 6.426 7.435 8.432 15.902 
Ln(PLBT) 144,795 7.350 1.764 -6.908 6.292 7.406 8.469 16.035 
Ln(Tangible Assets) 144,795 7.608 2.165 -6.908 6.279 7.812 9.070 16.204 
Ln(Employee Compensation) 144,795 8.622 1.200 -4.711 7.906 8.613 9.348 18.382 
Productivity 144,795 0.053 0.027 -0.428 0.037 0.052 0.068 0.578 
Log(GDP per Capita) 144,795 1.360 2.439 -8.075 0.459 1.663 2.552 25.163 
Log(GDP) 144,795 8.491 4.227 2.493 5.723 7.719 9.400 26.094 
Unemployment 144,795 1.728 12.847 -132.543 0.000 0.195 1.784 132.130 
IT Index  144,795 1.667 1.061 0.000 1.000 2.000 3.000 3.000 
C-Index 144,795 -0.001 0.047 -0.262 -0.010 0.000 0.017 0.294 
CIT 144,795 0.296 0.062 0.125 0.250 0.310 0.344 0.403 
Notes: The table depicts the descriptive statistics of all relevant variables. All absolute financial values are stated in TEUR and the logarithm of it. Unemployment 
is stated in percent. The C-Index and the CIT are stated in decimals.  
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Table 5: Baseline results 
Dependent Variable: Log(PLBT)        
Panel 2005-2016         
  Baseline 
Continuous 
interaction 
Categorical 
interaction 
Dummy 
interaction 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C-Index -0.516*** -0.111 0.153 0.154 
  (0.177) (0.267) (0.298) (0.298) 
IT Index   -0.003     
    (0.007)     
IT Index = 1     -0.002   
      (0.018)   
IT Index = 2     0.004   
      (0.018)   
IT Index = 3     -0.010   
      (0.020)   
IT available       -0.002 
        (0.017) 
C-Index x IT 3 Index   -0.240**     
    (0.119)     
C-Index x IT Index = 1     -0.976***   
      (0.343)   
C-Index x IT Index = 2     -0.564*   
      (0.323)   
C-Index x IT Index = 3     -1.023***   
      (0.364)   
C-Index x IT available       -0.809*** 
        (0.290) 
Log(Tangible Assets) 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log(Employee Compensation) 0.686*** 0.686*** 0.686*** 0.686*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Productivity  4.468*** 4.455*** 4.448*** 4.450*** 
  (0.346) (0.346) (0.346) (0.346) 
Log(GDP per Capita) 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Log(GDP) 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Unemployment -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year Fixed Effects x x x x 
Industry Fixed Effects x x x x 
Observations 144,796 144,796 144,796 144,796 
Number of firms 24,715 24,715 24,715 24,715 
R2 (within) 0.349 0.349 0.349 0.349 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the Huizinga and Leaven (2008) income-shifting model for 
144,769 firm-years of European affiliates of multinational corporations. Columns two to three include a novel 
measure for the digitalization of firms (IT Index). IT Index is determined as an additive index that captures if a 
firm has access to an ERP software, a database management system (DBMS) or groupware software. IT 
available is a dummy that indicates if a firm has access to any of the software categories. It is based on a yearly 
survey over the period 2005 to 2016.  The dependent variable is the logarithm of profits before tax. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile. We report standard errors clustered by firm in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.   
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Table 6: Reactiveness of digitalized firms on income shifting incentive shock  
Dependent Variable: Log(PLBT)     
Panel 2005-2016     
  
Firm is in the lowest decile 
of C-Index changes 
Firm is in the highest decile 
of C-Index changes 
Variable (1) (2) 
Decile Dummy 0.01 0.15*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
IT Index -0.01 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Decile Dummy x IT Index 0.09*** -0.07** 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Log(Tangible Assets) 0.16*** 0.16*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Log(Employee Compensation) 0.69*** 0.69*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Productivity  4.64*** 4.74*** 
  (0.35) (0.35) 
Log(GDP per Capita) 0.08*** 0.08*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Log(GDP) 0.00 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Unemployment -0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Fixed Effects x x 
Industry Fixed Effects x x 
Observations 138,345 138,345 
Number of firms 24,125 24,125 
R2 (within) 0.350 0.350 
Notes: This table presents the results for the changes in firm profitability in response to income shifting 
incentive shocks for all 138,345 firm-years of European affiliates of multinational corporations that experience 
a C-Index shock. The first two columns include a dummy that takes the value of one if the affiliate experiences 
a negative C-Index shock that is in the lowest decile of C-Index changes and zero otherwise (Decile Dummy). 
Comparably, columns three and four include a dummy equal to one if the firm experiences a positive C-Index 
shock in the highest decile of C-Index changes and zero otherwise (Decile Dummy). Columns two and four 
include an interaction of the Decile Dummy with a dummy that indicates if a firm has access to a specific 
software category that comprises our novel measure for the digitalization of firms (IT Index). It is based on a 
yearly survey over the period 2005 to 2016. The dependent variable is the logarithm of profits before tax. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile. We report standard errors clustered by firm in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.   
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Table 7: Cross-sectional analysis 
Dependent Variable: Log(PLBT) 
Panel 2005-2016         
  Country dispersion Accounting department 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C-Index -0.105 -0.118 -0.139 -0.109 
  (0.258) (0.267) (0.239) (0.269) 
Characteristic -0.609***   0.048***   
  (0.031)   (0.017)   
C-Index x Characteristic -0.666   -0.743**   
  (0.774)   (0.323)   
IT Index   -0.002   -0.001 
    (0.007)   (0.007) 
C-Index x IT Index   -0.073   -0.108 
    (0.146)   (0.140) 
C-Index x IT Index x Characteristic   -0.750**   -0.275* 
    (0.381)   (0.152) 
Log(Tangible Assets) 0.161*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log(Employee Compensation) 0.663*** 0.686*** 0.686*** 0.687*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Productivity  4.484*** 4.473*** 4.383*** 4.440*** 
  (0.344) (0.346) (0.350) (0.349) 
Log(GDP per Capita) 0.074*** 0.088*** 0.085*** 0.088*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Log(GDP) -0.007 0.007 -0.002 0.004 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Unemployment -0.005** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year Fixed Effects x x x x 
Industry Fixed Effects x x x x 
Observations 144,796 144,796 142,945 142,945 
Number of firms 24,715 24,715 24,306 24,306 
R2 (within) 0.357 0.349 0.348 0.348 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the Huizinga and Leaven (2008) income-shifting model for 
144,769 (142,945) firm-years of European affiliates of multinational corporations. Column one includes a 
measure for the country dispersion of firms. It is defined as the number of countries a firm is active in over the 
total affiliates of the group. Column three includes a dummy that determines if a firm has a dedicated accounting 
manager. In columns two and four, the firm-specific characteristics are interacted with a novel measure for the 
digitalization of firms (IT Index). IT Index is determined as an additive index that captures if a firm has access 
to ERP software, a database management system (DBMS) or groupware software. IT available is a dummy that 
indicates if a firm has access to any of the software categories. It is based on a yearly survey over the period 
2005 to 2016.  The dependent variable is the logarithm of profits before tax. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile. We report standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.   
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Table 8: Robustness I – Non-interpolated IT index 
Dependent Variable: Log(PLBT)      
Panel 2005-2016       
        
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
C-Index -0.276 0.024 0.026 
  (0.259) (0.295) (0.295) 
IT Index 0.002     
  (0.007)     
IT Index = 1   -0.018   
    (0.021)   
IT Index = 2   0.005   
    (0.018)   
IT Index = 3   -0.001   
    (0.020)   
IT available     -0.002 
      (0.017) 
C-Index x SW 3 Index -0.194*     
  (0.116)     
C-Index x IT Index = 1   -1.132***   
    (0.389)   
C-Index x IT Index = 2   -0.528   
    (0.322)   
C-Index x IT Index = 3   -0.889**   
    (0.359)   
C-Index x IT available      -0.775*** 
      (0.294) 
Log(Tangible Assets) 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log(Employee Compensation) 0.684*** 0.684*** 0.684*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Productivity  4.565*** 4.556*** 4.557*** 
  (0.349) (0.349) (0.349) 
Log(GDP per Capita) 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Log(GDP) 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Unemployment -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year Fixed Effects x x x 
Industry Fixed Effects x x x 
Observations 121,385 121,385 121,385 
Number of firms 24,520 24,520 24,520 
R2 (within) 0.350 0.350 0.350 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the Huizinga and Leaven (2008) income-shifting model 
for 121,385 firm-years of European affiliates of multinational corporations. It includes a novel measure for the 
digitalization of firms (IT Index). IT Index is determined as an additive index that captures if a firm has access 
to ERP software, a database management system (DBMS) or groupware software. IT available is a dummy 
that indicates if a firm has access to any of the software categories. It is based on a yearly survey over the 
period 2005 to 2016. Index values are not interpolated over time in this table. The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of profits before tax. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile. We report 
standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.    
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Table 9: Robustness II – Alternative control and dependent variables 
Panel 2005-2016             
  Controlling for intangibles 
CIT as income shifting 
incentive 
Log EBIT as dependent 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income shifting incentive 0.555* 0.908*** -1.186*** -0.830*** -0.268 -0.046 
  (0.312) (0.348) (0.221) (0.244) (0.248) (0.272) 
IT Index -0.016**   0.015   -0.009   
  (0.007)   (0.028)   (0.006)   
IT Index = 1   0.007   0.271***   0.004 
    (0.020)   (0.082)   (0.016) 
IT Index = 2   -0.006   0.121   -0.003 
    (0.020)   (0.078)   (0.016) 
IT Index = 3   -0.042*   0.135   -0.025 
    (0.022)   (0.088)   (0.018) 
Income shifting incentive x  
IT Index -0.270**   -0.059   -0.140   
  (0.135)   (0.089)   (0.108)   
Income shifting incentive x  
IT Index = 1   -1.118***   -0.898***   -0.724** 
    (0.402)   (0.258)   (0.315) 
Income shifting incentive x  
IT Index = 2   -0.827**   -0.371   -0.380 
    (0.375)   (0.244)   (0.295) 
Income shifting incentive x  
IT Index = 3   -1.101***   -0.459*   -0.656** 
    (0.416)   (0.276)   (0.331) 
Log(Intangible Assets) 0.055*** 0.055***         
  (0.004) (0.004)         
Log(Tangible Assets) 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log(Employee Compensation) 0.690*** 0.691*** 0.689*** 0.689*** 0.687*** 0.688*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Productivity  5.202*** 5.199*** 3.712*** 3.715*** 4.911*** 4.906*** 
  (0.379) (0.379) (0.346) (0.346) (0.312) (0.312) 
Log(GDP per Capita) -0.015 -0.016 0.101*** 0.101*** -0.044* -0.045* 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) 
Log(GDP) -0.016* -0.015 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.003 0.003 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Unemployment -0.008*** -0.008*** 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year Fixed Effects x x x x x x 
Industry Fixed Effects x x x x x x 
Observations 108,738 108,738 149,279 149,279 145,611 145,611 
Number of firms 19,838 19,838 25,151 25,151 24,616 24,616 
R2 (within) 0.369 0.369 0.348 0.348 0.398 0.398 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the Huizinga and Leaven (2008) income-shifting model for 
European affiliates of multinational corporations. The first two columns control for intangibles assets. Column 
three and four use the corporate income tax rate (CIT) as the income shifting incentive measure. Columns five 
and six use the logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes as the dependent variable. All columns include a 
novel measure for the digitalization of firms (IT Index). IT Index is determined as an additive index that captures 
if a firm has access to an ERP software, a database management system (DBMS) or groupware software. It is 
based on a yearly survey over the period 2005 to 2016.  The dependent variable in the first four columns is the 
logarithm of profits before tax. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile. We report 
standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.   
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